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Integrated hazard analysis (IHA) is a process used to identify and control unacceptable 
risk. As such, it does not occur in a vacuum. IHA approaches must be tailored to fit the 
system being analyzed. Physical, resource, organizational and temporal constraints on large-
scale integrated systems impose additional direct or derived requirements on the IHA. The 
timing and interaction between engineering and safety organizations can provide either 
benefits or hindrances to the overall end product. The traditional approach for formal phase 
safety review timing and content, which generally works well for small- to moderate-scale 
systems, does not work well for very large-scale integrated systems. This paper proposes a 
modified approach to timing and content of formal phase safety reviews for IHA. Details of 
the tailoring process for IHA will describe how to avoid temporary disconnects in major 
milestone reviews and how to maintain a cohesive end-to-end integration story particularly 
for systems where the integrator inherently has little to no insight into lower level systems. 
The proposal has the advantage of allowing the hazard analysis development process to 
occur as technical data normally matures. 
Nomenclature 
CDR        =    Critical Design Review 
CEV/CLV       =    Crew Exploration Vehicle / Crew Launch Vehicle  
DOD   =     Department of Defense  
FAA   =     Federal Aviation Administration  
IHA            =    Integrated Hazard Analysis 
ISS            =    International Space Station  
KSC            =    Kennedy Space Center 
NASA        =    National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
NSTS/STS  =    National Space Transportation System / Space Transportation System  
PDR        =    Preliminary Design Review 
PSRP        =    Payload Safety Review Panel  
SDR        =    System Definition Review 
SE&I/SAVIO =   Systems Engineering & Integration / Software and Avionics Integration Office  
SR&QA       =   Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance  
SRR        =    System Requirements Review  
I. Introduction 
 Traditional IHA phase safety reviews work well for small- to moderate-scaled systems. The inherent structure, 
unfortunately, breaks down when dealing with large-scale integrated systems. This paper will propose a solution to 
this problem by detailing both how to tailor the timing and how to modify the content of the formal phase safety 
review in order to provide technical coherency and viability to the program including the organizations providing 
the engineering, the integration as well as the safety of the overall end product. 
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Figure 1. FAA System of Systems Example
1 
II. Background 
A. Very Large-Scale Integrated Systems 
 
Large systems of systems type programs have been around for decades as various federal departments and 
agencies of the United States (FAA, DOD, NASA and others) adapt to our changing world.  Modern fighter planes, 
modern commercial jetliners, nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers are all large complex integrated systems of 
systems where multiple dedicated systems pool their resources and capabilities together to obtain a new, more 
complex system which offers more functionality and performance than simply the sum of the individual systems.  
Figure 1 displays one example of a system of systems for the FAA. These systems must coordinate their efforts and 
must work together to carry out a mission or achieve a national objective. Nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers, 
for instance, must support and sustain a small city of people while executing their various missions.   Life support 
systems, power, thermal control, and propulsions systems must be combined to create a vehicle that can support the 
people and the associated processes to accomplish various goals.   As the DOD and FAA responsibilities continue to 
grow, for example, it becomes very necessary to network existing assets together and to manage/control these assets 
more securely. This increased responsibility coupled with advances in technology led the push toward rudimentary 
large scale system of system programs. There was clear understanding in the initial formation of these programs that 
communication was the key to providing knowledge of location, health & status, caution & warning, battle readiness 
and other information in order to allow a coordinated effort between many heterogeneous components. The FAA, 
for instance, had to control more and more aircraft takeoffs and landings using the current hub-spoke system (see 
figure 1 left) and had to simultaneously monitor aircraft altitude and positions across the country in order to reduce 
the risk of aircraft collisions. One of the metrics the FAA uses to quantify aircraft safety is aircraft spacing.  As the 
number of airline flights has increased over the years, the number of simultaneous aircraft in the national airspace 
has increased (see figure 1 right). This presents a complex and daunting task for the FAA since increasing the 
number of simultaneous aircraft in the airspace decreases the margins allotted for aircraft safety. As similar large 
scale type systems continue to grow in use and to expand in capability, the interactions between the various 
subsystems grow more and more complex. In many of these cases, the interactions not only behave differently (as 
compared to small- or medium-sized systems), they actually conflict giving rise to the need for improved 
management strategies for large scale systems. 
Very large scale integrated systems are created when numerous dissimilar assets are linked together not only via 
communication interfaces but also by physical and functional interfaces. To add to the complexity, some of these 
fundamental interfaces are purposely or inadvertently connected and disconnected during a program‟s life cycle. 
This introduces a very important dimension when developing large scale integrated systems. This dimension is 
timing. Determining when each subsystem interfaces and influences other subsystems is just as important as 
determining how each subsystem interfaces with the others.  
Let‟s use the Pyramids of Giza as an example, even though they are very large structures which took decades to 
complete, they are not really considered very large scale integrated systems by today‟s standards. The fundamental 
building block the pyramid architects used was a basic stone block.  Though each stone block was tailored to do its 
job, the architects designed the block pieces to integrate together and to give rise to the singular pyramid structure.   
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Figure 2. Generic System Engineering Life Cycle “Vee” Model3 
 
Assembly was ordered and, for the most part, synchronized between stone block production and readiness to accept 
and place the blocks at the worksite.   The timing of the blocks for assembly and installation had a significant 
bearing on the amount of resources utilized in pyramid production. Timing is even more critical when considering 
today‟s large scale systems. While the building of a battleship may appear somewhat asynchronous, all of the parts 
must be made available in a particular order so that the ship manufacturer can ultimately assemble various copies of 
the same ship in an efficient manner.   Very large scale systems are made up of numerous blocks that are dissimilar 
and in fact are each unique to do a specific job where each piece is contributing its function to achieve overall 
program objectives.    
One-of-a-kind builds for large scale integrated systems create very diverse hardware development processes. 
This is because of the unique nature of the task. For small to moderate scale systems, like televisions or cars, the 
industrial build process can be developed as an assembly line process where the architect designates when and 
where each component will be integrated. For many large-scale, one-of-a-kind systems, it is extremely difficult to 
get the parts to arrive in a given order since the system has never been developed before and the replication process 
has not been conceived nor optimized.  To compensate, program managers usually adapt system integration 
strategies to the ability of each component being delivered. Programs with these features generally employ lots of 
simulators to not only test the capabilities of one major unit but also to allow for testing of a unit while other units 
are still in development. Two examples of these one-of-a-kind systems include the International Space Station (ISS), 
tasked to support human endeavors in low earth orbit, and NASA‟s Constellation program, tasked to return humans 
back to the moon. ISS is the first example of a very large integrated system where 44 one-of-a-kind elements were 
combined into one unique vehicle that could support up to seven crew and accommodate up to seven more visiting 
crew while providing all of the capabilities needed to run experiments and sustain human lives. NASA‟s 
Constellation program is another very large integrated system which is developing launch vehicles and space 
transportation vehicles unique to their coordinated missions to carry the crew to the ISS, the moon or even Mars
2
.   
According to the Constellation program plan, numerous unique physical and functional interfaces will be developed 
at different times for different phases of the overall mission.  Numerous projects or systems, for instance, will be 
initiated at times when their unique contracting and setup activities can get underway. Thus, in many cases, the 
sequencing of the project milestone reviews cannot be performed in step with the program milestones.  
Large scale integrated systems also suffer from the lack of clear terminology specifically with respect to what is 
called a system, a program , a project, an element, etc. For the purposes of this paper, two sets of terms will be used: 
one for ISS and the other for Constellation. NASA generally uses the term „program‟ to refer to the highest level of 
a system. The individuals who manage the overall system are called the „program office.‟ Both ISS and the 
Constellation programs have separate and distinct program offices. NASA allows each program to decide how to 
partition and name the various components of the program. In the case of ISS, the major components are called 
„elements.‟ In the case of Constellation, they are called „projects‟ or „systems.‟ Constellation managers have decided 
to call major components of each project an „element.‟ 
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Figure 3. Constellation’s Integrated Hazard Analysis Structure 
 
B. The Integrated Hazard Analysis Process 
 
In order to manage the complexities of large scale integrated systems, many organizations develop variations of 
the system engineering life cycle model (see generic example in figure 2). Generic system engineering processes 
follow the divide-conquer-integrate paradigm. That is, they attempt to formally analyze the large scale system by 
partitioning into smaller sequential steps like design, fabricate, integrate and test. Major decision points are 
integrated into the analysis to provide program managers periodic insights into the risks associated with the overall 
system. These decision points are called program reviews. Each program outlines the types of reviews it expects 
depending on the type of integrated system being developed. NASA, for instance, utilizes its NASA procedural 
requirements 7120.5D and levies them on all programs
4
. The Constellation program, for example, abides by this 
procedural requirement and utilizes the milestone reviews identified for human space flight projects. The reviews 
that are applicable to Constellation are system requirements review (SRR), system definition review (SDR), 
preliminary design review (PDR), critical design review (CDR) and flight readiness review to name a few.  
In addition to program reviews, each organization developing a large scale system also establishes a system 
safety process to ensure that risks are managed throughout the particular life cycle. To be effective, the system 
safety process should employ an iterative hazard analysis process so that all available data are analyzed early and 
often for potential hazards. Only in this way can safety be designed into the product and insights into potential 
undesirable behavior be revealed early enough to prevent or to mitigate the hazardous behavior by way of effective 
redesign. The hazard analysis process specifically iterates between the hazard causes and the hazard control story in 
such a way as to realize a system with acceptable risk. Massie, IHA lead for NASA‟s Constellation program, has 
prescribed four keys to success that if adopted will lead a system safety analyst to accomplish the enormous task of 
integrating various systems iteratively in a large scale distributed system
5
. These keys reveal strategic, operational 
and organizational lessons learned from previous IHA experiences including NASA‟s ISS program. The four keys 
are: 1) define the analysis structure, 2) provide a good IHA plan, 3) provide for good and reliable communications 
and 4) select and utilize the right personnel for the job. These steps were applied to NASA‟s Constellation program 
where the Orion crew exploration vehicle (CEV), the Ares I crew launch vehicle (CLV), mission operations, the 
astronaut suits and ground operations were integrated across a mission timeline with the purpose to dock the Orion 
space vehicle with the Space Station and safely return the crew to earth. The structure of Constellation‟s IHA 
involves analyzing the undesirable interactions between the projects that could lead to a hazard (see figure 3). The 
IHA process involved identifying the integrated system-level risks. This involves identifying all hazards from a 
systems perspective, identifying all causes to each hazard, revealing the control story and providing verification of  
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Figure 4. Systematic Hazard Analysis Process 
 
 
Figure 5. Overview of Constellation Phased Safety Review Process 
the controls in a systematic and iterative fashion (see generic flow in figure 4). According to Constellation 
guidelines, hazard-related risks are to be identified during phased safety reviews which occur around major program 
milestones. Hazards, for instance, are identified during the program‟s initial design cycle, causal contributors are 
identified during the system definition review, controls are identified and analyzed during the preliminary design 
review with the verifications outlined during the critical design review (see figure 5). At each major review, the goal 
of the iterative hazard analysis is to ensure that the system stays in a known safe state regardless of the mission 
timeline or the state transitions. The hazard analysis also attempts to update system requirements or system-level 
functions to ensure that the system remains in a known safe state according to the program‟s level of acceptable risk. 
C. Significant Roles within the IHA Process 
 
Because of the size of large scale systems, organizations typically divide organizational responsibilities as well 
as develop processes so that each organizational function can contribute to the end product. From an IHA 
perspective, there are three primary roles that interact to reduce hazards in large scale systems. These are the 
engineering role, the safety role and the integration role. 
 
1. The Engineering Role 
 
Each program will divide its major design function by the typical engineering disciplines.  At the program level 
these engineers become the leadership for the design of the integration of the hardware/software and operations for 
their discipline.  Their roles may be delegated or shared with other developers/projects but they become the de-facto 
experts for the data and program progress in their discipline.  
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2. The Safety Role 
 
The safety analysts become the authors of the hazard reports and partner with the leader of the engineering 
design discipline to create an accurate hazard analysis of the design.   They will work with each of the discipline 
efforts to assure that the design meets the intent of the applicable safety requirements. They also help the design 
team to document their results and aid the team by presenting those results to the safety review panel.   The success 
of the hazard analysis is totally dependent on the interactions of the hazard report authors and the design owners.  A 
second aspect of the safety role resides in the safety panel, the group of experts who review the author‟s hazard 
reports and provide constructive feedback to the authors to ensure that the analysis is conducted properly and to 
critique the risk results. 
 
3. The Integrator Role 
 
The hazard analysis integrator is the chief architect behind the hazard analysis and helps the hazard analysis team 
develop an architecture that best highlights the risks of the program, and assures that coordination of hazard analyses 
that overlap or touch on similar subject areas are coordinated.  The integrator assures that functions are assessed for 
hazards end-to-end without regard to who owns particular hardware/software components with a perspective that 
incorporates both sides of the interfaces. Additionally, the integrator assists the hazard analysis authors by 
guiding/directing/instructing them how to deal with the asynchronous development of the lower level data that is 
required to support the IHA. 
D. The Necessity of Healthy Interaction between Engineering, Safety and Integration 
 
It is healthy to exhibit a moderate amount of friction between engineering and safety personnel, particularly 
when the end product is high risk. The engineering team wants to meet performance objectives while the safety team 
tries to ensure that hazards do not occur. This relationship between the engineering design and safety personnel must 
be fostered into a push-pull relationship where the designer is looking at the design from the standpoint of why it 
works and the hazard analyst is looking from the why it might not work standpoint.   As they work together they 
must optimize the design to work as intended while simultaneously putting as much margin in as possible to 
preclude inadvertent functions from working when they are not needed and to prevent intended functions from 
working in unintended ways that could cause harm to the vehicle, the system or the crew.   
E. Timing and Content of the Traditional Phased Safety Review Process 
 
Overview of the phased safety review process has already been depicted in figure 5.  The interactions of the IHA 
projects used on NASA‟s Constellation program has already been shown in figure 3. The program interface (in the 
middle of figure 3) represents the primary integrator, that is, the organization responsible for integrating the lower 
level control story so the that program achieves a coherent, integrated end-to-end hazard story with respect to 
hazards.  
The genesis of the phased safety review process comes from the National Space Transportation System (NSTS) 
payload safety review process documented in NSTS 13830, Payload Safety Review Process
6
. This process was 
developed to allow NASA‟s Shuttle Program to review and evaluate the safety of experiments to be flown on Space 
Shuttle Missions.  The process was intended to iterate with the payload design process and require the payload or 
experiment developer to bring to the Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) the information necessary to allow the 
PSRP to provide timely input to the developer so that they could design in adequate safety features that preclude the 
experiment from causing harm to the Shuttle or the crew.  The Payload Program and Safety Review Process flow is 
shown in figure 6. 
Each phase of the payload safety review process brought the panel and designers together to discuss the needed 
safety features commensurate with the maturity of the program.  Figure 2 provides a general description of the 
typical development flow of a program. Program milestones are associated with each program development step 
where each step has an associated phase safety review set of expectations. 
System definition review (SDR) is a requirements baselining process and so the phase 0 safety review was used 
as a technical interchange meeting to discuss the incorporation of the payload safety requirement into the program 
requirements.  This meeting was also used to familiarize the PSRP with the design and operations concept and to  
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Figure 6. Typical Payload Safety Review Process 
 
help the designers understand the intent of each of the safety requirements.   Typical phase 0 safety reviews require 
the hardware providers to demonstrate that they understand the safety processes and the safety requirements and that 
they understand safety analysis sufficiently to identify their preliminary hazards and causes. 
Preliminary design review (PDR) is a process that validates that the preliminary design closes around the 
requirements.  The phase 1 safety review was developed then to evaluate the design concepts ability to close around 
the safety requirements.  Criteria for the phase 1 safety review is to have the hardware developers demonstrate that 
they have evaluated the design such that the hazard control approach will adequately satisfy the applicable safety 
requirements for each of the previously (phase 0) identified hazard causes.  Any gaps in the analysis or weakness in 
the control approach were addressed as needed areas for design concept change.  Phase 1 criteria also required the 
hardware developer to peek ahead at the plans for verification of the hazard controls and to identify the methodology 
intended to be used.   
Critical design review (CDR) is the acceptance of the detailed design and the beginning of design verification.  
At this phase 2 stage, the actual hazard controls are to be identified and validated to be a real part of the design. In 
addition, the hardware developer has to show the detailed verification plans for each hazard control and assure that 
those plans are comprehensive and adequate to assure that the controls are real and operate as intended in all 
expected environments and operational situations.  
Hardware delivery to Kennedy Space Center (KSC) launch site typically signified the completion of all design 
development manufacturing and test processes for the payload or experiment.   Thus prior to delivery, the safety 
review process required a final review (phase 3) meeting with the hardware developer to assure that the 
hardware/software and operations verifications went as planned and to deal with any anomalies in the verification 
program results.   Any hazard controls verifications that could not be accomplished before delivery (eg: payload to 
Orbiter separation system safing for deployable payloads) were tracked on a verification tracking log with results 
reported back to the PSRP and the program prior to flight. 
III. Tailoring the Timing and Content of Formal Phase Safety Reviews 
This section will describe the challenges in applying traditional phase safety reviews on two large scale 
integrated systems, will propose a modified half cycle safety review process and will discuss the risks associated 
with such a tailoring. 
A.  Challenges in applying the Traditional Three Phase Safety Reviews to a Very Large Scale Program 
 
1.0 International Space Station 
 
Historically, NASA develops a very large scale program about once every 20 years. Because of this, it must 
often update its processes to the latest industry standards when developing new large scale programs.   Apollo (circa 
1960‟s) was the 1st large scale NASA program, followed by the Space Shuttle program.  These programs 
incorporated safety via the application of national and local standards for hardware development relying heavily on 
Year 3 Year 2 Year 1 
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standards from the American National Standards Institute, Underwriters Laboratories, the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health and many other national organizations of the time.   The design analysis processes 
included failure modes and effects analyses and some early forms of hazards analysis but relied heavily on fault 
oriented techniques and processes of the day.  As Shuttle was completing development, MIL-STD-882
7
 was 
becoming the military standard for safety review processes and NASA developed the Payload Safety Review 
Process described in the prior section.    However, treatment of very large scale program safety for space was still a 
developing concept as the International Space Station was being conceived and initiated.   
The International Space Station wasn‟t just a large object like one of the Pyramids of Giza being launched into 
Orbit. It is truly as large integrated system of systems with dozens of developers both large and small.   The job of 
the integrator was to get this program (with all of its independently designed and developed parts) to work together 
in such a way as to provide a safe, long lasting and reliable habitable environment in space. The Shuttle program 
already developed the payload safety process so this process was adopted to facilitate the safety of the emerging 
International Space Station design.   However, it eventually became apparent that there were four major obstacles 
that had to be analyzed, understood and tailored before simply applying the traditional payload safety process to ISS 
development.    
First and foremost, ISS wasn‟t just a program but a program of programs.  Each module was a major program in 
it‟s own right that required full scale development engineering processes.  With a planned 44 missions to develop, 
build and expand ISS, there needed to be 44 sets of three phased safety reviews.  Very large scale programs 
accomplish what they can accomplish when they can accomplish it. However, they usually undergo many schedule 
iterations and even complete revisions as they get the different development and manufacturing operations 
underway.  As the design progresses a common architecture and design arises.  This design emerges through 
systematic top-down development efforts and via iterative development cycles within the program architecture.   
This concurrent and iterative development approach created huge challenges for the traditional payload safety 
review process.  132 Safety reviews over the initially planned development period of about 10 years was barely 
achievable with typical full element reviews running up to 3 weeks in length.  The simultaneous start of most 
elements put huge pressures on the safety review process to hold many of these reviews at the same time. Neither 
the panel nor the integrators could support such a schedule and get any other work done – like the actual integrated 
hazard analysis.   Program modifications like addition of an entire new module infused still more demands on the 
safety review process.   To further compound the problem, purely logistic flights to ISS were added to the manifest, 
which brought hundreds of new pieces of small hardware to the ISS but added no new functionality to the vehicle, 
but still needed evaluated against the safety requirements.   
A second challenge for the ISS program safety review process was that the Payload Safety Review Process 
required a phase 3 safety review which included evaluation of the hardware/software/operations verifications prior 
to delivery of the hardware to the Kennedy Space Center for launch processing.  However all of the hardware was 
being delivered to the Kennedy Space Center with the intent of complete assembly and test operations to be 
performed.  Later the program added integrated testing between the elements which was to be accomplished by 
functionally attaching as many elements/modules together as could be accommodated and running or enabling the 
critical systems.  This left the safety review process with no hard review point at which to review the testing and 
verification results before these modules would be flown.  In fact, some final verification could not be completed 
until the modules were attached and checked out on orbit.  
A third challenge to the payload safety review process for ISS was the sheer volume of paper involved.  
Complete traditional safety data packages for a payload might span 2500 pages for an experiment that fit in a 2‟ x 2‟ 
locker.   The safety review process had to learn to manage data and information much better to preclude having to 
review a large number of hazard reports. For example, there might be 45 (counting integration) hazard reports, each 
reiterated the following typical comment from an ISS hazard report author, “my structure is designed to the 
appropriate Space Station Structural Design Standards and meets the 1.5 Factor of Safety with a positive Margin of 
Safety.”   
Fourth, the ISS program did not go through the traditional SDR, PDR and CDR development cycles.  ISS was 
based on a more integrated incremental design review process and then a series of system integration reviews related 
to the operations for each flight.  With so many elements in various stages of development at different periods of 
time there wasn‟t a true PDR/CDR at the program level to address the integrated design in a traditional phased 
safety review manner. 
Thus, in the case of the ISS program, asynchronous hardware development timing was a major challenge to 
holding the traditional phased safety review processing for the integrated system.  This challenge manifests itself 
differently in every large scale program and thus requires unique solutions to each program but this feature can help  
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Figure 7:  Concurrent Program and Phased Safety Review Milestones through Phase I – Synchronous 
Milestones  
 
drive a more consistent solution between various programs if the particular issues are well considered.  Large scale 
programs share this asynchronous approach to major element development and so the safety review process must be 
adapted to accommodate it. 
 
2.0 Constellation Program 
 
The next major large scale program NASA has pursued is the Constellation program.  Constellation shares 
several features of very large scale programs with the ISS Program.  In particular, the asynchronous development 
processes for each of the major elements (called Projects on Constellation).   Thus, major Projects like the Orion 
CEV and the rocket that launches it, the ARES CLV, are proceeding on their own program development cycles 
independent of each other and the other major projects on the program.   
CxP program has elected to proceed at the integrated program level on a more typical program development 
process including a program SSR, SDR, PDR, and CDR.    However this cycle is based more on high level 
integration objectives and so is not sequenced with the project milestones of similar type.  So the phase 1 safety 
review associated with Orion development was not completed at the time of the program level PDR and associated 
phase 1 reviews even though ARES had completed its hardware PDR. In fact, most of the other projects had not 
even started their PDRs yet. This asynchronous timing of the program/project milestones not only makes it difficult 
if not impossible to meet the actual traditional phase safety review criteria it also puts pressure on the hazard 
analysis organizations to support a process that the data does not support particularly if the process review criteria is 
applied rigidly. 
Constellation program managers also decided that in order to create safety inputs earlier into the design they 
would require the Phased Safety Review Process milestones to occur in exact sync with the program milestones.  
See figure 7 for how a synchronized flow of this type would have to occur.   Of course, with asychronized starts of 
the different projects this plan is not realizable.  More importantly, via inspection of this simple flow one can 
quickly see that the more elements that are added to this flow the more compressed the support schedule for this 
approach becomes until enough elements are added that even a controlled synchronization schedule cannot be 
sustained because of too many elements trying to hold their project milestones in the same block of time.  
Eventually so many elements/projects are added that the system becomes asynchronous. Very large scale programs 
must all deal with these phenomena.   In fact, asynchronous development actually allows the developers to arrive at 
the goal more closely together ultimately contributing to a much early design completion if managed well. 
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3.0 The factors that drive an acceptable solution 
 
The hazard analysis processes itself must run in parallel with the program (see figure 5) so that it can take in 
information as its being developed, interpret it, assess its impacts and respond to the program in a way that affects 
the program in a useful way.   Infusing ill-timed changes into the program in the name of safety has in the past 
brought about the very incidents that were trying to be precluded.  For example, it is very difficult for the program to 
deal with a new hazard that has been discovered and requires mitigation shortly before final delivery of the product 
to the customer.   The program processes for designing, manufacturing and testing the influences of new design 
features are not well equipped to respond to late change needs.    Programs like Tethered Space Satellite
8
 have 
suffered when it tried to implement late imposed safety features that ultimately caused major system failure because 
all of the impacts of the new design could not be understood before manufacturing and assembly and delivery.  In 
this case, a late breaking change in the name of safety resulted in loss. During the first Tethered Space Satellite
 
mission which occurred on the Space Shuttle (STS-46) in July of 1992, a protruding bolt had prevented full release 
of the tether. This was due to an improper late-stage modification of the deployment reel system. A re-flight of the 
tether system happened on February 25, 1996, where five hours after deployment, the tether cable suddenly snapped 
near the top of the deployment boom due to debris. The typical response to these events is for follow on programs to 
pressure the system safety process to provide safety input earlier.  This is a logical request but must be looked at 
carefully to assure input is not so early that it is either of no value (due to lack of detail) or timed on top of the major 
program milestones such that it cannot be incorporated into the design milestones. 
Ideally, the program architects need to make sure that the safety process can be fed appropriately mature data, 
with enough time to synthesize it and then to provide adequate input based on this data to the program describing 
both the expectations and safety feature needed in time for the design to incorporate them into the next major 
milestone. The architect of the program safety review process must then consider the need for early hazard control 
inputs to the program development process and how to allow flexibility in the safety review process to accommodate 
the asynchronous lower level project or element milestone flows.   As previously explained, some programs put the 
safety review milestones well after the program milestones of equivalent maturity so that the safety process can be 
based on the program milestone mature data (see figure 6).  For example, the most common approach is to hold a 
phase 1 safety review up to 90 days after a program PDR so that the safety process can be a full assessment of the 
program PDR data.   This has the advantage of making the safety process input mature but provides very little input 
to the program on the needed changes to the design before the program milestone itself.  And this approach requires 
delay of the program phase 1 safety review until all projects have completed their PDRs and associated phase 1 
safety reviews.  
Other programs accelerate the entire expectations of the safety review process, forcing the safety analysts to seek 
data that exceeds the maturity of the program as whole.   An example of this condition would be when phase 0 
expectations resemble phase 1 criteria and phase 1 safety review criteria more closely resembles phase 2 safety 
review criteria.  This approach has the advantage of earlier notification of issues and needed design changes by 
advancing the safety review process ahead of the program, but most programs struggle implementing this approach 
because of the mismatch in data maturity and the process expectations.  When combined with subsequent, 
asynchronous development cycles of the lower level elements/projects, successful completion of these high 
expectation reviews is neither realistic nor achievable. 
 Other approaches have also been attempted like holding the phase safety reviews concurrent with the program 
milestones (see figure 7), or decoupling the safety review process from the typical program milestones  - all of these 
approaches create mismatches either in data maturity, in personnel available to support the safety review process, or 
in timeliness of safety inputs to the program. 
The mismatch of personnel resources to support the safety review process is an often overlooked major driver to 
the success of the program and safety integration.   This mismatch can be created by timing safety process demands 
and program milestone demands such that both reach peak demand at the same time and reach minimum demand at 
the same time.  As shown in figure 7, at the program level the design organizations must review their requirements, 
create the design to meet those requirements, study the implications of their design and prepare reports, 
presentations and supporting data for the program milestone reviews.   The safety analysis process requires the same 
thing of the safety analysts, but the two processes are codependent.  Forcing them to operate in an exact step –for-
step fashion creates huge demands on the design and safety analysts‟ time that are in perfect conflict.   To support 
the program PDR the designers need the safety analysts to review all of the data that provides input to the design 
solutions (eg; lower level procurement specifications, lower level design details, interface control requirements, etc) 
and provide safety inputs that will affect the design and assure compliance with the safety requirements.  However,  
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Figure 8: Half Cycle Phased Safety Review Process – Synchronous Flow 
 
at the same time the safety engineers need the designers to review their analyses and provide design details to make 
the safety analysis complete.  But the designers are trying to create the design and the safety analysts are trying to 
analyze the emerging design at the same time.  This creates a perfect conflict of resources and goals.  Everyone is 
consumed with their own processes at the same time and each cannot help the other effectively.   
Therefore in order to architect an effective program the design analysis and safety analysis cycles need to be 
synchronized to become more complementary such that one can feed the other.  In addition, the asynchronous nature 
of very large scale program development must be accommodated for any review process to be successful.   In order 
to solve the first problem a natural proverbial “chicken and egg” problem must be addressed.   If the hazard analysis 
needs design information to do an assessment and the design organization needs safety input to even create an 
effective design it would seem both should “go first.”   Thus, further review of the features of both processes is 
required to arrive at successfully integrated program architecture.  And in fact, a solution to the first problem 
presents an opportunity to solve the second problem. 
B.  Proposal: A Modified Formal Safety Review Process (in terms of Timing and Content) 
 
1.0 Creating a Half Cycle Safety Review Process 
 
Looking at the problem from the point of view of program-level needs brings potential solutions to light.   The 
program needs safety criteria or input for each major milestone.  The program then needs an evaluation of its ability 
to satisfy those requirements prior to the next milestone and needs the evaluation results in time to react to the 
identified shortcomings in satisfying the safety requirement before the next milestone.  The safety process is setup to 
create evaluations of available data and provide input to the design organization for their next major design cycle.  
All previously discussed safety process timing solutions give rise to the mismatches in safety issue identification, 
program resources or safety review process expectations so a new solution could be more effective. 
One way to address the mismatches is to shift the safety review process timing such that it looks backward to 
what‟s been done at the prior program milestone AND forward to what‟s needed for the next milestone.   To look 
simultaneously forward and backward at the program milestones, the safety process then would have to be placed 
strategically BETWEEN the program milestones instead of trying to run concurrent with them.  This strategy also 
immediately solves the resourcing conflicts because each process reaches its peak resource demands at one half 
cycles apart (see figure 8).   This approach frees the safety analysts to participate in the review item disposition 
creation and resolution processes that feed the program milestones reviews and thus support the entire program  
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Figure 9:  Half Cycle Safety Review Process – Asynchronous Flow 
 
milestone.   In addition, it calls upon the program designers to support the hazard analysis development process and 
the safety reviews when they are not encumbered by the program milestone review demands.   
This new approach solves two of the mismatch problems very readily.  So we need to investigate the potential 
for expectation mismatches with program data maturity.  Placing the program safety review processes at program 
milestone one half steps requires redefining the phase safety review criteria somewhat.   In fact, it requires a 
meshing of the prior program milestone safety criteria with the upcoming milestone criteria. 
If we assume this proposal was implemented on a large scale integrated system like Constellation, the phase 0 
review would become a phase 0/1 review held between SDR and PDR.  The assessments that support this meeting 
would be based on the program SDR data and identify expectations for the program to meet for the PDR.   Doing 
this assessment halfway between the milestones means that the program will be well on it‟s way towards creating 
the preliminary design but not finished yet, therefore design change requests from the safety process can be readily 
implemented before the program PDR.  Another major benefit is that the hazard analysts can then use their phase 
0/1 review results to support their evaluation of the program PDR data and have a solid basis for the review item 
dispositions they write.   This whole cycle iterates again between PDR and CDR and again between CDR and 
hardware delivery.   
 
2.0 Dealing with Asynchronous Lower Level development cycles 
 
Establishing half cycle safety reviews solves the problems of mismatched requirements and data flows between 
the program level hazard analysis and design organizations.  In addition, this process resolves resource demand 
mismatches as well.   And most importantly it provides an avenue for aligning safety expectations with program 
maturity (see figure 9).   
Additionally, the process has the ability to align expectations with the hardware/software/operations maturity 
that allows the half cycle safety review process to address asynchronous lower level development.   Because the 
expectations can now be defined across the spectrum of phase 0/1 expectations and later at phase 1/2, this flexibility 
allows the analysis to mature in synch with the program and the safety review panel to adjust their expectations for 
each piece of the developments maturity.   Thus, it is important to establish the exact criteria for each hazard cause 
based on the maturity of the design of the associated hardware/software and operations.   This will allow both timely 
injection of safety features into the parts of the design that are developing while simultaneously allowing for 
evaluation of the more mature parts of the design and the allocation of expectations for the next program milestone 
based on the results of those evaluations.   
Refinements in selecting the actual safety review dates not only are required to optimize the available program 
PDR data being evaluated but also are used to maximize the time the program has to react to the half cycle milestone 
safety review results. The best way to achieve optimization of this approach is to first consider the needs of the 
safety process (note that in the first iteration of this new approach we based it on the needs of the program).   The 
safety process needs as much next program milestone level data as possible while affecting this same milestone 
design.   Starting the safety assessment exactly halfway between the milestones and allowing 60 days to cycle that 
process, would shift the actual safety review to be 90 – 120 days off the midpoint between the program milestones.  
However since a typical large scale program has at least one year between program major milestones this is readily 
accommodated by a program.   
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In particular this approach is of most benefit to very large scale integrations.  Transfer of requirements, design 
and manufacturing data follows a long trail of asynchronous successive lower level project, element or system 
milestones and must be supported by the same design and hazard analysis personnel at the program milestones, 
moving the safety review processes milestones to these “between” program milestones creates flexibility in the 
overall program scheduling and allows for optimization of resources. 
C.  Risks Associated with the Half Cycle Safety Review Proposal  
 
There are a few risks that need considered in modifying the timing of the currently standardized safety review 
process.  First of all, there can be a perception that the safety reviews themselves are no longer part of the program 
milestones.  It is up to the program safety, reliability and quality assurance (SR&QA) and program managers to 
assure that the successful completion of the half cycle milestone safety reviews be a part of the program milestone 
success criteria.  In addition, to mitigate this perception, depending on program size and complexity, it may be wise 
to hold a mini phase review meeting that updates the status of each hazard cause from a relative risk standpoint for 
just a day or so during the program milestone period.  This full phase risk update meeting would need very limited 
resources to support it and could then become the finalization of the half cycle review and closure for the program 
milestone review.  
Meshing of the full phase criteria from the prior milestone data and the full phase criteria for the next milestone 
could be a complex challenge.   If approached very literally, redefining each criterion for each hazard cause and 
program situation could result in meeting expectation conflicts between the safety review panel and the hardware 
developer or between supporting organizations.  It is important here that the program and the SR&QA organizations 
meet and clearly define the data set maturity to be used for the safety review and that the reviewing panel understand 
the various levels of  maturity in the design of that dataset before entering the review.   This, however, is done by 
leveraging the program configuration management process to help define the relevant design data for the meeting.  
So the particular details of the design for each part of the program (project, element, system, subsystem) are 
predefined and understood.  Knowing the program maturity in each area serves as the appropriate basis for 
determining the actual criteria for the half cycle milestone meeting.  Clearly, all of the phase safety criteria for the 
prior program milestone applies but the SR&QA and hazard analysis teams will need to define what criteria from 
the subsequent program milestone is applicable to specific parts of the design.  This whole process will have to 
iterate for each half cycle milestone safety review.  However, as the program design matures and we reach the phase 
3 closeout process, these criteria will naturally sync as there are no more forward milestone reviews after phase 3.  
Finally, this process should end with a formal closeout that supports the program certification of flight readiness 
process or a Phase 4 safety review.  This meeting would serve as a final closeout of hazard control verifications and 
allow for the safety panel and program design organizations to jointly buy off on the final safety products and 
design. 
IV. Conclusion 
Traditional safety review timing for large scale integrated systems has many mismatches that must be taken into 
account during the engineering and safety analysis processes. This paper presents a proposed approach to timing for 
formal safety reviews. The authors describe how the end products of the IHA development process are unviable 
using the traditional approach. This approach alleviates these problems and allows the hazard analysis process to 
occur as data normally matures.  
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